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1 Introduction
In many sensitive situations, group decisions are required to be unanimous. Examples
include a number of international organizations that would not exist without granting
some sort of veto power to their members.1 They also include partnerships and other
unlimited liability companies, and criminal trials by jury in the US. The central question
in this paper is: what voting system is best in such situations?
When agents have no uncertainty about their preferred alternative, all unanimous
rules are equivalent a proposal to reform the status quo is only accepted if it is Pareto
improving (Wicksell 1967 [1896] and Buchanan and Tullock 1962). Unanimous rules are,
however, not equivalent when agents are uncertain about the merits of a proposal and
share common objectives. This is because voting then ought to aggregate the information
dispersed among agents. The problem is that unanimous decision making is believed to
aggregate information poorly (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998, Guarnaschelli, McKelvey,
and Palfrey 2000).2 This raises the question of whether a group necessarily sacrices
information aggregation when it grants veto power to its members.
In this paper, we compare the performance, in the laboratory, of two of the most widely
used unanimous rules: unanimity rule and majority rule with veto power (henceforth
Unanimity and Veto).3 Under Unanimity, agents must consent or dissent. The reform
is then adopted if and only if no one dissents. Under Veto, agents can consent, dissent,
or veto. The proposal is then accepted provided that no one vetoes and a (simple or
qualied) majority consents. The main di¤erence is that under Unanimity agents cannot
convey negative information about the reform without blocking it altogether. The intense
debate during the early years of the United Nations Security Council on the impossibility
of dissenting without vetoing illustrates that this di¤erence is far from innocuous (Sievers
and Daws 2014).
And indeed, we nd that, in contrast to Unanimity, Veto consistently aggregates infor-
1See, e.g., Zamora (1980), Posner and Sykes (2014), and Maggi and Morelli (2006); and Bouton,
Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe (2016) for a discussion.
2Coughlan (2001), Duggan and Martinelli (2001), Persico (2004), and Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and
Malherbe (2016), however, highlight cases where unanimous decision making features good information
aggregation properties.
3Among international organizations Unanimity is used, e.g., by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the European Council (for most sensitive topics, excluding Common Foreign and Security Policy),
and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). In contrast, Veto (or a close variation) is used, e.g., by the
European Council (for the Common Foreign and Security Policy), the United Nations Security Council.
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mation well in the laboratory. Hence, our ndings provide empirical support to our pre-
vious theoretical result that Veto Pareto dominates Unanimity (Bouton, Llorente-Saguer,
and Malherbe 2016). This provides a rationale for the use of Veto in practice and sheds
light on the evolution of decision-making practices in the United Nations Security Council
and the Council of the European Union. It also suggests that it would be benecial for
voting bodies that currently use Unanimity to adopt Veto instead.
Our experiment design follows the typical setup considered in the information aggre-
gation voting literature. There are two possible states of the world (Red or Blue). Agents
observe a binary private signal (red or blue) that is correlated with the realized state.
They have a common objective: they are all rewarded if the group decision (Red or Blue)
matches the state (decision Red represents the status quo). To make the group decision,
they hold a simultaneous vote according to a pre-specied voting system: Unanimity or
Veto.
Theoretically, the welfare performance of these voting rules depends on the informa-
tion structure. To understand this idea, note that under both rules, any single agent can
enforce the status quo. If the red signal is su¢ ciently informative relative to the blue
signal, enforcing the status quo when observing a red signal is a weakly dominant strat-
egy. In this case, where the red signal is decisive, information aggregation is relatively
straightforward and both Veto and Unanimity are e¢ cient. When the red signal is not
decisive, however, information aggregation is a more subtle problem and Veto outperforms
Unanimity because it o¤ers the possibility of revealing a negative signal without pinning
down the outcome.
We consider both cases in the laboratory. First, in the case where a red signal is
not decisive, we use equally informative signals as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)
and Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey (2000). We nd that groups using Veto make
about a third the number of mistakes as those who use Unanimity. This di¤erence is
due to a dramatic reduction of type II errors. That is, using Veto makes it much less
likely that agents will reject a good reform (or in the typical jury interpretation, acquit
a guilty defendant). In the case where a red signal is decisive, we nd that performances
under Veto and Unanimity do not di¤er signicantly. Our data therefore provides strong
empirical support for the theoretical predictions.
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We then analyze subject behavior in detail. This is important because, unless we can
convince ourselves that the model is a su¢ ciently good predictor of subject behavior, we
can hardly extrapolate our welfare results to variations in group size and information struc-
ture, for instance, let alone draw policy implications. Overall, despite some heterogeneity,
we nd that the model predicts aggregate behavior fairly well.
Finally, to inform the comparison between Unanimity and Veto, we run control treat-
ments with two alternative voting rules: simple majority rule (henceforth Majority) and
unanimity rule under the constructive abstention regime (henceforth Constructive Ab-
stention). Beyond being a standard benchmark in the literature, the Majority treatments
are useful to assess the consequences of equilibrium multiplicity under Veto. Constructive
Abstention is strategically equivalent to Veto but changes actions focality. We exploit
this framing di¤erence to study the sensitivity of Vetos welfare properties to the presence
of less sophisticated agents.
Related Literature
Our paper is the rst to compare the information aggregation properties of di¤erent
unanimous voting rules in the laboratory.
Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) documents evidence of strategic voting
under Unanimity in the Condorcet Jury setup. They show that, in line with theoretical
predictions, subjects vote against their signal and that this improves information aggrega-
tion with respect to sincere voting. Goeree and Yariv (2011) also nd evidence of strategic
voting. In addition, they nd that allowing for communication among agents before the
vote substantially reduces the impact a voting rule has on the group decision, even when
theory predicts that it should not be the case.4 Our paper contributes to this literature
in at least two ways. First, and most importantly, we expand the set of unanimous rules
beyond Unanimity by considering Veto and Constructive Abstention. Second, we consider
information structures (i.e. the case where the red signal is decisive) for which unanimous
rules are optimal mechanisms.5
4Other recent papers on information aggregation in committees include Battaglini, Morton and Pal-
frey (2010), Morton and Tyran (2011), Bhattacharya, Du¤y and Kim (2014), Grosser and Seebauer (2013),
Fehrler and Hughes (2014), Le Quement and Marcin (2015), Mattozzi and Nakaguma (2015), Herrera,
Llorente-Saguer and McMurray (2016), Mengel and Rivas (2016). See Palfrey (2015) for an overview.
5Bhattacharya, Du¤y and Kim (2014) consider biased information structures but not the case where
the red signal is decisive.
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Veto power has been studied and compared in private value environments. Relevant
papers include Wilson and Herzberg (1987), Haney, Herzberg and Wilson (1992), Kagel,
Sung, and Winter (2010), Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2012), and Nunnari (2014).
In this literature, veto rights constrain the set of implementable policies. In common-value
environments such as ours, agents do not use veto for their purely private benet. Instead,
vetoing is a way to convey negative information about the proposal. When negative signals
are precise enough, veto rights improve information aggregation.
Finally, our paper also contributes to the literature on framing that builds on Tversky
and Kahneman (1981). Applications to political science have shown, for example, that
the outcome of a vote can be a¤ected by the ordering on the ballots (Miller and Krosnick,
1998), the use of core-value electoral platforms (Brewer, 2001) or the emphasis in the
initiativestitles (Bütler and Maréchal, 2007). We contribute to this strand of literature
by focusing on equivalency framing e¤ects, which studies how di¤erent logically equivalent
frames a¤ect choices (see Druckman, 2001). A typical strategy in these studies is to frame
the same problem in terms of gains or losses. What we do is di¤erent in that we manipulate
actionsfocality. Moreover, we do this in a strategic environment, in which, to a certain
extent, sophisticated agents are able to compensate the actions of the agents that are
a¤ected by the frame.
2 Theory
2.1 The Model
A group of n  3 agents (with n odd)6 must vote over two possible alternatives, Blue and
Red.
Information structure. There are two states of nature, ! 2 f!B; !Rg, which materialize
with equal probability. The actual state of nature is not observable, but each agent
privately observes an imperfectly informative signal: either sB or sR (the blue or red
signal, respectively). Conditional on the state of nature, the signals are independently
drawn. The probability that an agent will observe signal sB is higher in state !B than in
state !R; and the converse is true for sR. We denote the probability of receiving signal s
6That n is odd only simplies the exposition.
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in state ! by Pr (sj!) :
Preferences. Agents have common values: they all prefer decision Red in state !R and
Blue in state !B.7 We capture this with the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function: u : f!B; !Rg  fBlue;Redg ! R; with u (Red; !R) = u (Blue; !B) = 1, and
u (Red; !B) = u (Blue; !R) = 0.
Voting systems. The group makes a decision by taking a simultaneous vote. We mainly
focus on two voting systems: Majority with Veto power (V ) and Unanimity (U). A voting
system 	 2 fU; V g is dened as a set of possible actions A	 and an aggregation rule
d	 that maps agentsactions into a group decision: d	 : fa 2 A	gn ! fBlue;Redg. We
denote by Xa the total number of agents playing action a. Agents do not communicate
before making their decision.8
Denition 1 Voting system Veto is dened by: V  fAV ; dV g, where:
AV = fb; r; vg
dV =
8<: Blue if Xv = 0 and Xb > XrRed otherwise.
The group decision is Blue if and only if no one plays v and there is a majority that
plays b. The decision is Red otherwise. Hence, we interpret b as a vote for Blue, r
as a vote for Red, and v as a veto (against Blue). To highlight the di¤erences and
similarities between the voting systems, it is convenient to dene Unanimity using the
same aggregation rule as in the denition above (dV ) and to label the di¤erent actions in
a similar fashion.
7Assuming that all agents behave strategically, the potential presence of agents that prefer the status
quo for private reasons neither a¤ects the comparison of unanimous rules nor the behavior of common
value agents (Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe 2016).
8This assumption is not innocuous. In our setup, if communication were allowed, full information
sharing would be possible under both Unanimity and Veto (i.e. there would exist an equilibrium in which
agents truthfully reveal their information at the communication stage and the revealed information is used
to reach an optimal decision at the voting stage). However, this appealing feature disappears when agents
di¤er (su¢ ciently) in their disutility from wrong decisions (Coughlan 2001, Austen-Smith and Feddersen
2006). But, in that case, Veto still dominates Unanimity (Bouton, Llorente-Saguer and Malherbe 2016).
Moreover, there are indeed plenty of situations in which communication is di¢ cult and/or costly. See
Persico (2004) and Section 6 in Bouton, Llorente-Saguer and Malherbe (2016) for a thorough discussion
of hurdles to communication in related contexts.
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Denition 2 Voting system Unanimity is dened by: U  fAU ; dUg, where:
AU = fb; vg  AV and dU = dV , with Xr necessarily equal to 0.
Under Unanimity, agents can play b (vote for Blue) or v (veto Blue). The group
decision is Blue if and only if everyone plays b (votes for Blue).
Strategy and equilibrium concept. Formally, we dene an agents strategy as a
function  : fsB; sRg ! 4 (A	) : In particular, a(s) denotes the probability with which
an agent who receives signal s plays a. Following Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), we
focus on responsive symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria.9
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis and Welfare Properties
In Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe (2016), we characterize the equilibrium under
Veto and prove welfare results in a more general version of the model.10 A key aspect
of the welfare analysis is that unanimous rules should be compared according to their
information aggregation properties. To do so, we can rely here on the concept of right
decision.
Denition 3 The right decision maximizes agentsexpected utility given the realized sig-
nal prole. A voting system is e¢ cient if it leads to the right decision always being taken.
What the right decision is depends on the number of signals of each color, and on their
relative precision. When the information structure is su¢ ciently biased, it can be the case
that a single red signal is decisive.11
Denition 4 We say that a red signal is decisive if, unless all signals are blue, the right
decision is Red (i.e. keeping the status quo).
In the experiment, we consider a case where a red signal is decisive, and a case where
it is not. In this section, we formally state the relevant theoretical results on which our
9 In our context, a responsive prole is such that (i) at least some agents play action b with positive
probability, and (ii) not all of them play b with probability 1. This ensures that, in equilibrium, some pivot
probabilities are strictly positive and agents a¤ect the outcome of the vote with positive probability.
10That is, we consider all admissible parameters and we allow for the presence of private value agents.
11The relevant condition is Pr(sRj!R)
Pr(sRj!B) >

Pr(sB j!B)
Pr(sB j!R)
n 1
:
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hypotheses are based, and we briey discuss why we chose these cases. We do not repeat
the proofs in this paper, but we give the details of where to nd them in Appendix A2.
2.2.1 Baseline case: a red signal is not decisive
The baseline case is the most interesting. In the corresponding parameter region, we have
chosen to focus on signals that are equally informative. This corresponds to the case
originally studied by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and then taken to the laboratory
by Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000). Comparing our experimental results to
theirs o¤ers a simple robustness check in terms of subject behavior.
Lemma 1 Assume Pr (sBj!B) = Pr(sRj!R).
 Unanimity admits a unique equilibrium: b (sB) = 1, v (sR) = 1    and
b (sR) = 
 where  2 (0; 1);
 Veto admits two equilibria, one in pure strategies: b (sB) = r (sR) = 1, and one in
mixed strategies, which are equivalent to those in the equilibrium under Unanimity.
As Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) have shown, it is not an equilibrium under Una-
nimity for agents to play b with a blue signal and v with a red signal. This is because
agents are only pivotal when all other agents play b. Under this strategy, that would imply
that they all have received a blue signal, which gives a strong incentive to disregard ones
red signal and play b instead. This is why, in equilibrium, agents with a red signal mix
(probability  is such that they are indi¤erent between playing b and v).
Under Veto, there are two equilibria. In the pure strategy equilibrium, agents simply
play the color of their signal. Doing so, the group always makes the right decision. Hence,
there is no reason to deviate. The second equilibrium mimics that under Unanimity. If no
other agent ever plays r, playing r becomes strategically equivalent to playing b; a single
vote for Red (instead of Blue) cannot change the group decision.
Our welfare criterion is an agents expected utility. Given that agents equally dislike
both types of errors, it corresponds to the ex-ante probability to make the right decision.
Proposition 1 Assume Pr (sBj!B) = Pr(sRj!R);
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 if agents coordinate on the pure strategy equilibrium under Veto, they make the right
decision with a strictly higher probability than under Unanimity;
 if agents coordinate on the mixed strategy equilibrium under Veto, the two systems
are welfare equivalent.
Under Veto, the mixed strategy equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the pure strategy
one, and it is also unstable.12 This is why we see it as a less credible predictor of agents
behavior. Beside comparing the realized welfare properties of Veto and Unanimity, running
the experiment o¤ers us an empirical test of such an equilibrium selection prediction. To
this purpose, running a control treatment under simple majority rule o¤ers a natural
benchmark for such a test because, in its unique equilibrium, strategies are equivalent to
the pure strategy equilibrium under Veto.13
That Veto strictly dominates Unanimity extends to any biased signal structures as
long as the red signal is not decisive. Note however that the Pareto dominant equilibrium
may then include mixed strategies.14
2.2.2 Extreme case: a red signal is decisive
When the red signal is decisive, Veto no longer strictly dominates Unanimity. Under both
rules, it is a weakly dominant strategy for agents with red signals to play v. Taking this
into account, agents with blue signals optimally choose to play b, and the group always
makes the right decisions.
Lemma 2 If a red signal is decisive, Veto and Unanimity admit a unique equilibrium
where b (sB) = r (sR) = 1.
Proposition 2 If a red signal is decisive, Veto and Unanimity are welfare equivalent.
Even though they are welfare equivalent (they are both e¢ cient), Veto has a larger
action set and, as we discuss below, the sincere action does not necessarily coincide with
equilibrium strategies. This could undermine Vetos information aggregation properties.
12 If other agents with red signals play r with strictly positive probability, playing r or b are no longer
strategic equivalent, and the equilibrium unravels.
13See Appendix A1 for a formal denition and the catarachterisation of equilibrium.
14This is similar to what happens under the simple majority rule.
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2.2.3 Sincere voting and framing e¤ects
To analyze departures from strategic behavior, it is worth discussing the notion of sincere
voting, which is often used in the literature. In a related paper, Austen-Smith and
Banks (1996) describe sincere voting as an individuals optimal voting decision based
solely on her own private information. That is, agents vote sincerely if they select the
alternative yielding their highest expected payo¤ conditional on their own signal.
In our setup, contrarily to theirs, such a denition of sincere voting does not nail down
the agents choice of action under Veto. If they receive a blue signal, playing b is the
unambiguous sincere action. But, if they receive a red signal, there are two candidates for
the sincere action as both playing r or v favors Red.
This ambiguity leaves the door open to di¤erent denitions. In the spirit of previous
literature, we consider agents that are a¤ected by the focality of an actions label i.e., the
focal action for decision Red is r.15 Given the way we have dened Veto, this corresponds
to a vote for Red. But it is also possible to frame the voting system in such a way that
playing r amounts to vetoing Blue.
This frame is unanimity rule under the constructive abstention regime (Constructive
Abstention), which we formalize as follows.16
Denition 5 Voting system Constructive Abstentionis dened by: CA  fACA; dCAg,
where ACA = fb; c; rg and
dCA =
8<: Blue if Xr = 0 and Xb > XcRed otherwise.
Under Constructive Abstention, agents can play b, c, or r, and the group decision is
Blue if and only if (i) no one plays r and (ii) more agents play b than c. This system is
strategically equivalent to Veto, in the sense that it also has three possible actions and
the aggregation rule is equivalent. They only di¤er in their labeling (c and r correspond
respectively to r and v under Veto; b does not change). Hence, playing r corresponds to
vetoing under Constructive Abstention, whereas it is a vote for Red under Veto.17 Since
15An alternative denition would be that sincere voters vote for the strongest action that favors their
most preferred outcome (based on their own information). Here, this would correspond to playing v when
receiving a red signal.
16We named this system after the notion of constructive abstention introduced by the Treaty of Ams-
terdam (1997).
17To avoid confusion, we will stick to the terminology "vote for Blue", "vote for Red", "veto".
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r is now the focal action corresponding to the red signal, we have that sincere agents do
veto when they receive it (they still vote for Blue with a blue signal). Hence, while Veto
and Constructive Abstention lead to identical outcomes in our strategic voting model, this
will not necessarily be the case in the presence of sincere agents.
First, consider the baseline case. Since sincere actions and equilibrium strategies are
the same under Veto, the presence of sincere agents is therefore inconsequential. This
is not true, however, under Constructive Abstention because these agents use their veto,
which is ine¢ cient. In the extreme case, it is under Constructive Abstention that the
presence of sincere agents does not a¤ect the outcome, and it is under Veto that it does;
because sincere agents vote for Red instead of vetoing when they get the red signal.
Ultimately, what we are interested in is the comparison with Unanimity. The presence
of sincere agents a¤ect negatively the performance of Unanimity in the baseline case (those
who receive a red signal veto excessively), but not in the extreme case. This leads to the
following empirical predictions: in the presence of sincere agents, (i) Veto outperforms both
Unanimity and Constructive Abstention in the baseline case, (ii) Constructive Abstention
and Unanimity outperform Veto in the extreme case.
This said, it is important to note that sincere agentsimpact on welfare depends on the
ability of strategic agents to adjust their strategies so that the group behavior resembles the
optimal one (we refer to this mechanism as compensation). Unfortunately, in the baseline
case under Constructive Abstention, sincere agents who receive a red signal use their veto
power, which strategic agentscannot overturn. By contrast, under Veto, sincere agents
do not use their veto power when it is e¢ cient to do so. This leaves room for correction by
strategic agents. The presence of sincere agents should thus be less consequential under
Veto in the extreme case, than under Constructive Abstention in the baseline case.
3 The Experiment
3.1 Design and Procedures
To test our theoretical predictions and potential framing e¤ects, we ran controlled labo-
ratory experiments. Experiments were conducted at the BonnEconLab at the University
of Bonn between June and September 2012. We ran a total of 48 sessions, each comprised
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of 18 subjects. No subject participated in more than one session. Students were recruited
through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2004), and the experiment was
programmed and conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Subjects were introduced to a game with the same structure as the one presented
in Section 2.1. Following the experimental literature on the Condorcet Jury Theorem
initiated by Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000), we did not refer to states of
the world or signals but to jars and balls respectively. There were two jars, the Blue jar
(representing state !B) and the Red jar (representing state !R). Each jar contained a
total of 100 red and blue balls. The proportion of red and blue balls in each jar varied
across treatments.
Each time the game was played, one of the jars was randomly selected with equal
probability by the computer. The subjects were not told which jar had been selected, but
they were privately shown a ball randomly and independently drawn from the selected jar.
Hence, a blue ball corresponds to sB and a red ball corresponds to sR. After seeing their
ball, the subjects had to vote. The possible votes and the aggregation rule varied across
treatments.
If the group decision matched the color of the jar, the payo¤ for all members of the
group was 100 talers. Otherwise, it was 10 talers.
We had two treatment variables, which led to a 2 4 design and eight di¤erent treat-
ments. The rst variable was the voting rule. We experimented using the four voting rules
described above: Veto (V), Unanimity (U), Majority (M), and Constructive Abstention
(CA). Their framing was the following. To vote, subjects had to click a button of their
choice. In V treatments, subjects had to choose among blue; red; and veto: If a subject
vetoed, the group decision was the Red jar. If nobody vetoed, the group decision was the
jar whose color had received the most votes (in a language that can be common to our four
voting systems, we refer to these actions as voting for Blue, voting for Red and vetoing,
respectively). In U treatments, subjects had to choose between blue and red. The group
decision (that is, the jar that was selected by aggregating the votes) was Blue if and only
if all subjects chose blue (these actions correspond to voting for Blue and vetoing). In
M treatments, subjects also had to choose between blue and red, but the group decision
was the jar whose color had received the most votes (these actions correspond to voting
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for Blue and voting for Red). In CA treatments, subjects had to choose between blue,
abstain, and red. If a subject chose red, the group decision was the Red jar. If nobody
chose red, the group decision was the Blue jar, as long as there were more votes for Blue
than abstentions (these actions correspond to voting for Blue, voting for Red and vetoing,
respectively).
The second variable that varied across treatments was the information structure the
likelihood of getting the right signal in either state. In Setting 1 (the baseline case), this
likelihood was the same in both states: Pr (sBj!B) = Pr (sRj!R) = 0:7. In Setting 2 (the
extreme case), signal precision di¤ered. In fact, the red signal was decisive: Pr (sBj!B) =
0:99 and Pr (sRj!R) = 0:3.
We ran six sessions for each treatment. Each session consisted of 50 rounds played by
the same 18 subjects. In each round, these subjects were randomly split into two groups
of 9, and the game was played separately in each group. Table 1 provides an overview of
the di¤erent treatments.
Treatment
Voting
system
Setting
% blue balls
in Blue jar
% bed balls
in Red jar
V1 Veto 1 70% 70%
U1 Unanimity 1 70% 70%
M1 Majority 1 70% 70%
CA1 Constr. Abs. 1 70% 70%
V2 Veto 2 99% 30%
U2 Unanimity 2 99% 30%
M2 Majority 2 99% 30%
CA2 Constr. Abs. 2 99% 30%
Table 1: Treatment overview.
All experimental sessions were organized along the same procedure: subjects received
detailed written instructions, which an instructor read aloud (see Appendix A5). Before
starting the experiment, students were asked to answer a questionnaire to conrm their
full understanding of the experimental design. After the questionnaire, subjects began to
play. At the end of each round, each subject received the following information: (i) the
jar that was selected by the computer, (ii) the group decision, (iii) the number of votes
for each alternative, and (iv) their payo¤ for that period.
To determine payment at the end of the experiment, the computer randomly selected
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ve periods; the total amount of talers earned in these periods was converted to euros
with a conversion rate of 0.025. In total, subjects earned an average of 12.99e, including
a show-up fee of 3e.
3.2 Equilibrium Predictions and Alternative
Equilibrium strategies. Table 2 summarizes the predictions of behavior drawn from
Lemmas 1 and 2. In the baseline case, there are 2 equilibria under V and CA. In the
table below, and henceforth, when we refer to the model predictions, we assume that
agents coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium (the one in pure strategies).
Baseline case (1) Extreme case (2)
% for Blue for Red veto % for Blue for Red veto
Veto blue ball 100 0 0 100 0 0
red ball 0 100 0 0 0 100
Unanimity blue ball 100   0 100   0
red ball 77   23 0   100
Majority blue ball 100 0   66 34  
red ball 0 100   0 100  
Constr. Abs. blue ball 100 0 0 100 0 0
red ball 0 100 0 0 0 100
Table 2: Equilibrium Predictions. Predicted probability (in percentage) of playing each
action for each signal (ball) received, voting rule, and setting.
Sincere voting. As explained above, the sincere voting hypothesis assumes that subjects
vote for the action that corresponds to their signal color. Note that this implies identical
predictions in the baseline and extreme cases. Table 3 summarizes the predictions.
4 Experiment: Results and Analysis
The main purpose of this section is to present our empirical analysis of the dominance
of Veto over Unanimity. First, we compare average payo¤s and information aggrega-
tion scores. Second, we delve into subject behavior to assess whether the results can be
attributed to the di¤erences in behavior predicted by the model and/or by the sincere
voting hypothesis. We rst consider the baseline case and then the extreme one. Finally,
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% for Blue for Red veto
Veto blue ball 100 0 0
red ball 0 100 0
Unanimity blue ball 100   0
red ball 0   100
Majority blue ball 100 0  
red ball 0 100  
Constr. Abs. blue ball 100 0 0
red ball 0 0 100
Table 3: Predicted probability (in percentage) of playing each action for each signal (ball)
received under sincere voting.
we exploit the framing e¤ects (Veto versus Constructive Abstention) to push further the
analysis of sincere voting.
All the non-parametric tests we refer to are two-sided and use averages at the matching
group level as their unit of analysis. To allow for learning in the initial periods, we focus
on the second half of the experiment. That is, we present in the main text our analysis of
rounds 26 to 50.18 Our statements about statistical signicance are at the 10% condence
level. Unless stated explicitly, they also holds for the whole 50 rounds.
4.1 Does Veto dominate Unanimity and if so, why?
4.1.1 Baseline case
Payo¤s. Table 4 displays realized average payo¤s under the two rules and compares
them to the model predictions and those under the sincere voting hypothesis. The results
and predictions under Majority are also displayed as a point of comparison. To facilitate
interpretation, we present payo¤s in terms of the proportion (or probability) of mistakes.
Experiment Model predictions Sincere voting
Veto 12:7 9.9 9.9
Unanimity 38:3 34.0 48.0
Majority 12.3 9.9 9.9
Table 4: Proportion (in percent) of mistakes in baseline case treatments.
We nd that the proportion of mistakes is roughly 3 times larger under Unanimity
than under Veto. This di¤erence is statistically signicant (Mann-Whitney, z = 2:898,
18See Appendix A3 for a comparison with the rst half.
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Figure 1: Information aggregation score in treatments V1, U1 and M1.
p = 0:004),19 which provides strong support for the hypothesis that Veto strictly dominates
Unanimity in this case. In contrast, payo¤s under Veto and Majority are very close (and
not statistically di¤erent: Mann-Whitney, z = 0:081, p = 0:935).
Information aggregation. Ultimately, we are interested in whether the right decisions
are taken. A simple way to assess this is to look at all the cases where the realized
signal prole includes a given number of balls of each color (say, for instance, 6 blue
and 3 red) and compute the proportion of times that the group made the right decision
(Blue in this example) in these cases. There is, however, a caveat; there are very few
observations for some signal prole realizations (for instance, 9 blue, 0 red), which can
give us a noisy picture. To circumvent this issue, we simulated 10,000 group decisions for
each possible number of blue balls received in a group based on actual individual behavior
(see Appendix A4 for details). With these, we computed an information aggregation score,
that corresponds to the proportion of decisions that were right.
Figure 1 plots these scores for Veto, Unanimity, and Majority for each possible num-
ber of blue balls in the draw (0 to 9). In addition, the gure includes the information
aggregation score predicted by our two benchmarks: the model prediction and the sincere
voting hypothesis.
First, consider Veto (see V1, on the left panel). Both benchmarks predict perfect
scores. We nd that essentially no mistakes are made when there are 3 blue balls or
less in the draw. When there are 4 or 5 blue balls, approximately 20% of decisions are
mistakes. The natural interpretation is that in such cases, it only takes the deviation
19See the Mann-Whitney tests for all pairwise comparisons in Appendix A3.
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from equilibrium of a single individual for the group decision to be wrong. Finally, as the
number of blue balls goes to 6 and more, the proportion of mistakes steadily goes down
again.
Under Unanimity: (i) the model predicts poor information aggregation, and (ii) the
sincere voting hypothesis predicts even worse information aggregation on average, but no
mistake when there is a majority of red balls (i.e., there is no type I error or in the jury
interpretation, an innocent is not convicted). First, we nd that when there is a majority
of red balls, there are almost no mistakes. This is very close to the sincere voting outcome,
but it stands in sharp contrast to the model prediction (about a 10 to 20% mistake rate
depending on the ball draw). However, when there is a majority of blue balls, there are
many more mistakes than what the model predicts (for example, only 4% of decisions are
right with 5 blue balls, compared to more than 30% according to the model). In fact,
the realized information aggregation score lies between the model prediction and sincere
voting (except for 9 blue balls), closer to sincere voting.
In line with the theoretical prediction, we nd that Veto does aggregate information
better than Unanimity. When there are 5 blue balls or more, the di¤erence is economically
large, and statistically signicant.20 When there is a majority of red balls, both systems
have close-to-perfect scores.21 This means that the gains from using Veto instead of
Unanimity essentially materialize through a drastic reduction of errors of type II (i.e.
false negatives such as not adopting a good reform, or acquitting a guilty defendant).
To assess the absolute performance of Veto, it is useful to compare it to Majority (M1,
right panel), which is well known for its good information aggregation properties (at least
in this case). We can see that Veto does almost as well as Majority. The only signicant
di¤erence occurs with 6 blue balls and more, where Majority does slightly better.
Behavior. Can the dominance of Veto over Unanimity be attributed to the predicted
di¤erences in behavior? To answer this question, it is helpful to delve further in the
comparison between Veto and Majority. Table 5 presents the average frequency at which
agents who received a given signal played a given action.
20We performed non-parametric tests separately for each number of balls based on the simulations.
21When there are 3 or 4 blue balls, Unanimity does slightly better on average, but these di¤erences
are not statistically signicant. When there are 2 blue balls or less, Veto does very slightly better (the
di¤erence is statistically signicant).
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% for Blue for Red veto
Veto blue ball 96.4 (100) 3.1 (0) 0.5 (0)
red ball 3.2 (0) 94.5 (100) 2.3 (0)
Unanimity blue ball 92.2 (100) - 7.8 (0)
red ball 52.9 (76.7) - 47.1 (23.4)
Majority blue ball 95.6 (100) 4.0 (0) -
red ball 5.3 (0) 94.8 (100) -
Table 5: Aggregate behavior in the baseline case (treatments V1, U1, and M1). Each cell indicates
the percentage of voting blue, red, or veto given the color of the received ball. Model predictions
are indicated between brackets.
First, we note that behavior under Unanimity and Majority is overall consistent with
previous studies (Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey 2000, and Goeree and Yariv 2011).
Under both Veto and Majority, the model predicts that agents play the color of their ball
blue if they receive a blue signal and red if they receive a red signal. We nd that
subject behavior is fairly close to this (they play accordingly 96% and 94% of the time,
respectively). These average frequencies are remarkably close to what we observe under
Majority. They are not signicantly di¤erent (Mann-Whitney, z = 1:121, p = 0:262 both
for red and blue signals). However, while the proportion of deviations is almost identical
under the two systems, the deviations themselves are di¤erent. Even though they do not
generate signicant di¤erences in overall average payo¤, it provides an explanation for
why Veto gets a slightly lower information aggregation score than Majority when there is
a majority of blue balls. A veto in such cases is indeed very likely to overturn the right
decision that would have otherwise been made by the majority of non-vetoing players.
Figure 2 provides a useful representation of individual behavior. Start with Majority
on the right panel. The horizontal axis gives the frequency at which agents with a blue
signal voted for Blue. The vertical axis gives the frequency at which agents with a red
signal voted for Red. Hence, the equilibrium strategy (represented by an orange triangle)
and sincere voting behavior (represented by a green diamond) are on the top right corner.
Each hollow circle in the graph corresponds to the number of subjects who played at those
frequencies: the larger this number, the bigger the circle. We can see that the vast majority
of subjects always play as predicted (84%). And indeed, average behavior (represented by
the red circle) is very close to the top right corner.
Now, turn to Veto, on the left panel. Unlike in the case of Majority, there are now
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Figure 2: Individual behavior in treatments V1 and M1. Each hollow circle in the graph corre-
sponds to the observed frequence of play: its size represents the number of subjects who actually
adopted that frequence of play. The red circle represents the average frequency of play observed, the
orange triangle represents the symmetric equilibrium prediction and the green diamond represents
the sincere voting prediction.
three possible actions. To facilitate comparison, we abstract from cases where subjects
vetoed (which corresponds to less than 2% of total votes). That is, we report frequencies
conditional on playing r or b.22 Overall, the picture is remarkably similar to that of
Majority: a vast majority of subjects always vote as predicted (79% of total votes).
To sum up, both at the aggregate and the individual level, behavior under Veto is
remarkably in line with that under Majority, and arguably pretty close to the model
predictions. We interpret these as a reasonable validation of our equilibrium selection
assumption, and as being consistent with the hypothesis that predicted behavior is driving
the good information aggregation performance. Note, however, that equilibrium strategies
correspond here to the sincere actions. We will return to this issue in Section 4.2.
Now consider what happens under Unanimity. As we can see in Table 5, subjects
massively vote for Blue when they receive a blue signal (92%), which is the action predicted
by the model (and by the sincere voting hypothesis). However, when they receive a red
signal, they veto (i.e., they play r under Unanimity) 47% percent of the times, which is
substantially higher than the model prediction (23%). This qualitative feature is in line
with the previous ndings of Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) and Goeree
2291% of the subjects in treatment V1 never vetoed in the second half. Out of the 10 subjects that did
veto at least once, 5 did so less than 10% of the time.
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Figure 3: Individual behavior in treatment U1. Each hollow circle in the graph corresponds to
the observed frequency of play: its size represents the number of subjects who actually adopted
that frequency of play. The red circle represents the average.
and Yariv (2011). Overall, there is a larger proportion of votes that are not in line with
the model prediction. Since these deviations lean toward a higher proportion of veto, this
o¤ers a natural interpretation for why Unanimity generates almost no errors of type I and
many more errors of type II than predicted.
Figure 3 depicts individual behavior under Unanimity. Here subjects cannot vote for
Red. Accordingly, the vertical axis gives the frequency at which agents with a red signal
veto. We nd that most agents with a blue signal vote for Blue a majority of the time.
However, there are a number of subjects that sometimes veto when they receive a blue ball.
This is not easy to rationalize, but given that the group decision is most often Red anyway,
this is not necessarily costly (in the sense that the subject is unlikely to be pivotal).23
We observe two opposite subject clusters for red signals. Some (31%) always veto in
that case. Others (41%) always vote for Blue. A possible interpretation is that agents
specialize instead of mixing. Another is that some agents vote sincerely (i.e., veto) and
the others compensate. A conclusion one could draw from this latter interpretation is that
there are too many subjects playing sincerely (and the others cannot fully compensate),
which drives the redistribution of errors towards type II and an overall performance that
23Based on the idea that agents are more likely to make mistakes if payo¤s are not too di¤erent,
Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) show that quantal response equilibrium can indeed account
for some of the departures from the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Information aggregation score in treatments V2, U2 and M2.
is poorer than that predicted by the model.24 Before delving further in the issue of sincere
voting, we now turn to the extreme case.
4.1.2 Extreme case
Payo¤s. In the extreme case, the model predicts identical outcomes under Veto and
Unanimity. Table 6 displays realized and predicted average payo¤s in this case. We nd
that average payo¤ is higher under Unanimity than under Veto (13% of mistakes compared
to 10%), but this di¤erence is not statistically signicant (Mann-Whitney, z = 1:046, p =
0:295). The table also reports the results for Majority, which does much and signicantly
less well (Mann-Whitney, z = 2:822, p = 0:005, for the comparison with Veto).25
Experiment Model predictions Sincere voting
Veto 13:3 6.3 45.1
Unanimity 10:0 6.3 6.3
Majority 29.3 24.2 45.1
Table 6: Proportion of mistakes in the extreme case (treatments V1, U2 and M2).
Information aggregation scores. Figure 4 displays information aggregation scores.
Here, the right decision is Blue if and only if all the balls are blue.
We nd close to perfect information aggregation under both Veto and Unanimity. Most
(of the overall few) mistakes happen when there are many blue balls. When there are 5,
24Specialization has been observed in other experiments on information aggregation. See, e.g., Bouton,
Castanheira, and Llorente-Saguer (2016).
25This result adds the case where a red signal is decisive to the experimental literature that compares
Unanimity and Majority.
21
6, 7, or 8 blue balls (but not 9), the slight di¤erence in score in favor of Unanimity is
statistically signicant.
Interestingly, Veto does much better than what sincere voting predicts. Similarly,
aggregation scores in Majority (M2 in the right panel) are very close to the model predic-
tions and much higher than under the sincere voting hypothesis when they di¤er. Both
observations are other big hints of strategic behavior. Let us examine this in further
details.
% for Blue for Red veto
Veto blue ball 86.6 (100) 12.4 (0) 1.0 (0)
red ball 3.4 (0) 12.2 (0) 84.4 (100)
Unanimity blue ball 99.5 (100) - 0.5 (0)
red ball 9.8 (0) - 90.9 (100)
Majority blue ball 66.9 (66) 33.1 (34) -
red ball 2.3 (0) 97.7 (100) -
Table 7: Aggregate behavior in the extreme case (treatments V2, U2, and M2). Each cell indicates
the percentage of voting blue, red, or veto given the color of the received ball. Model predictions
are indicated between brackets.
Behavior. Table 7 displays the voting frequencies in the extreme case. First, under
Veto, note that 84% of the subjects that received a red signal did not vote for Red (the
sincere action) but decided to veto instead, which is in line with strategic behavior. Still,
we observe more departures from the model prediction than in the baseline case. For both
signals, a striking 12% of agents vote for Red (the model predicts 0%). Under Unanimity,
the sincere actions correspond to equilibrium strategies and voting frequencies are overall
close to the predictions. Here, the notable departure from the model prediction is that
subjects who received a red signal play blue 10% of the time. For both systems, a tentative
interpretation of the departures could be that some subjects are reluctant to nail down
the group decision (in a sense, they could be pivotal averse). Under Unanimity, this
could account for the asymmetry in deviations (most deviations are subjects with a red
ball voting for Blue). Under Veto, such reluctance could help to explain the substantial
proportion of agents voting for Red with a red ball. Of course, this latter behavior is also
consistent with sincere voting. However, we also have a substantial proportion of subjects
with blue balls that vote for Red. This cannot be accounted for by sincere voting, but
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Figure 5: Individual behavior in treatments V2 and U2. Each hollow circle in the graph corre-
sponds to the observed frequence of play: its size represents the number of subjects who actually
adopted that frequence of play. The red circle represents the average frequency of play observed, the
orange triangle represents the symmetric equilibrium prediction and the green diamond represents
the sincere voting prediction.
could reect strategic compensation for those with a red ball who do not veto. Finally,
under Majority, 33% of agents with a blue signal voted for Red. This is strikingly close to
the model prediction (34%).
Let us now compare individual behavior under Veto and Unanimity (see Figure 5). To
facilitate such a comparisons we abstract, for V2, from the action that is further away from
the model prediction (i.e., playing b with a red signal and playing v with a blue signal) and
is indeed played at a very low frequency. On the vertical axis, we display the frequency
at which v is played conditional on r or v being played, and on the horizontal axis we
display the frequency of b conditional on b or r.26 Under Unanimity, model predictions and
sincere voting coincide. We nd that a very large fraction of agents always act accordingly
(i.e., their behavior corresponds to the top right corner). Still, a non-negligible fraction of
agents vote for Blue with a red ball, which is not consistent with equilibrium behavior or
sincere voting. This is the main reason for the type II errors one observes when there are
7 or 8 blue balls (see Figure 4).
Under Veto, we nd more heterogeneity in behavior than in the baseline case. The
behavior of only a very few subjects is consistent with sincere voting (they are on the
26The vertical axis is therefore di¤erent than that of V1 in Figure 2.
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Figure 6: Individual behavior in treatment M2. Each hollow circle in the graph corresponds to
the observed frequence of play: its size represents the number of subjects who actually adopted
that frequence of play. The red circle represents the average
bottom right corner): only 4% of subjects consistently vote sincerely. Still, a substantial
proportion of agents do not veto when they receive a red signal (even though this is a
weakly dominant strategy). We also observe a number of subjects that always veto with
a red ball but that mix with a blue ball. This behavior is consistent with compensating
behavior.
Finally, under Majority, agents overwhelmingly vote red when they receive a red ball.
With a blue ball, behavior seems consistent with at least two interpretations: some degree
of specialization (instead of randomization according to the model symmetric equilib-
rium) and/or some sincere voting with countervailing compensation. On average, voting
frequencies are almost spot on the equilibrium prediction.
To sum up, we nd more departures from the model prediction than in the baseline
case. Some are consistent with sincere voting (12% vote for Red with a red signal un-
der Veto, for instance) and some are not (10 % vote for Blue with a red signal under
Unanimity). However, the performances are barely a¤ected in terms of average payo¤ or
information aggregation. The key reason for this is that most departures consist of voting
for Blue or Red (as opposed to veto). These deviations impair information aggregation
but do not preclude it: since these actions do not nail down the group decision, it is still
possible that the right decision will be made by the group. Hence, they can be interpreted
24
as noise that slightly a¤ects average payo¤. Now, an interesting question arises: what
would happen if sincere voting implied exerting ones veto power?
4.2 Sincere Voting and Framing E¤ects
As explained in Section 2.2.3, Constructive Abstention is strategically equivalent to Veto
but its labeling makes vetoing the sincere action for agents with a red signal. In this
section, we exploit this framing di¤erence to explore how the presence of sincere agents
a¤ects outcomes and welfare.
4.2.1 Payo¤s and information aggregation.
Baseline case Extreme case
Experiment Model Sincere Experiment Model Sincere
Veto 12:7 9.9 9.9 13:3 6.3 45.1
Constr. Abs. 36:3 9.9 48.0 15:7 6.3 6.3
Unanimity 38:3 34.0 48.0 10:0 6.3 6.3
Table 8: Proportion of mistakes under Veto, Constructive Abstention, and Unanimity.
Table 8 displays the payo¤s. First, we nd that Veto strongly and signicantly domi-
nates Constructive Abstention in the baseline case (Mann-Whitney, z = 2:892, p = 0:004),
which is consistent with the presence of sincere agents. Looking at information aggrega-
tion scores (see Figure 7) tells us that this comes from the cases with 5 blue balls or more,
where the di¤erence is economically strong and statistically signicant.27 This suggests
that the impossibility for strategic voters to compensate a veto exerted by a sincere agent
is indeed relevant. We also nd that Constructive Abstention does not do signicantly
better then Unanimity (Mann-Whitney, z = 0:326, p = 0:744). In fact, Constructive Ab-
stentions information aggregation scores are very similar to those of Unanimity.28 Rather
than the impossibility for strategic agents to compensate, it may then be that the reason
why Constructive Abstention does not do well is that agents coordinate on the Pareto
dominated equilibrium.
Second, in the extreme case, Constructive Abstention does slightly less well than Veto
27 It is not statistically signicant for 0, 3, or 4 blue balls.
28Focusing on the di¤erences that are statistically signicant, Constructive Abstention does slightly
better when there are 0, 1, 5, 6, 7, or 8 blue balls, and U does better when there are 4.
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Figure 7: Information aggregation score in V, U and CA treatments.
(and Unanimity), but the di¤erences are not statistically signicant.29 Note that informa-
tion aggregation scores (Figure 7) in V2 and CA2 are also very close (the small di¤erences
are not statistically signicant). This is interesting, because, in the presence of sincere
agents, we would expect Constructive Abstention to do better than Veto. This raises a
series of questions: is sincere voting under Veto in this case less prevalent than under
Constructive abstention in the baseline case? Is it that strategic agents are able to com-
pensate? Is it linked to strategic uncertainty or equilibrium uniqueness? Inspecting voting
behavior will help us partially answer these questions.
4.2.2 Behavior and interpretation.
Baseline case Voting frequencies under V1 and CA1 are very di¤erent (see Table 9).
The key points to note are the following. Among agents with a red ball, while 28% veto in
CA1 (where it is the sincere action) only 2% do so in V1 (where it is not). In CA1, we also
have that 10% of subjects with a red ball vote for Blue (this is the natural compensating
action), and that 16% with a blue ball did not vote for Blue.30 Finally, the di¤erence in
29Mann-Whitney, z = 1:529, p = 0:126 (Constructive Abstention versus Veto), and z = 1:376, p =
0:169 (Constructive Abstention versus Unanimity). Note, however that the di¤erence with Unanimity is
signicant if one considers the full sample (Mann-Whitney, z = 1:684, p = 0:092). The di¤erence mainly
comes from an relative increase in payo¤s under Constructive Abstention in the second half, which may
reect di¤erences in learning across these treaments.
30This is hard to rationalize, but given the observed voting frequencies, the unconditional probability
that another agent vetoes is fairly high. Hence, the likelihood of being pivotal is very low, and thus the
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voting behavior between CA1 and U1 is hardly consistent with subjects coordinating on
the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. We can therefore rule out such an hypothesis.
Baseline case (1) Extreme case (2)
Ball % for Blue for Red Veto % for Blue for Red Veto
V blue 96.4 (100) 3.1 (0) 0.5 (0) 86.6 (100) 12.4 (0) 1.0 (0)
red 3.2 (0) 94.5 (100) 2.3 (0) 3.3 (0) 12.2 (0) 84.4 (100)
CA blue 84.5 (100) 10.6 (0) 5.0 (0) 86.7 (100) 11.4 (0) 2.0 (0)
red 10.2 (0) 62.2 (0) 27.6 (0) 3.8 (0) 6.1 (0) 90.1 (100)
U blue 92.2 (100) - 7.8 (0) 99.5 (100) - 0.5 (0)
red 52.9 (77) - 47.1 (23) 9.8 (0) - 90.9 (100)
Table 9: Aggregate behavior under Veto, Constructive Abstention, and Unanimity (treatments
V1, CA1, U1, V2, CA2, U2). Each cell indicates the percentage of voting blue, red, or veto given
the color of the received ball.
Figure 8 displays individual behavior. First, consider CA1, located on the right panel.
There is some clustering around the top right corner, which corresponds to the sincere
actions. But this is far from overwhelming as this represents only 6% of the subjects
(though this number grows to 10% if we look at agents that choose the sincere actions at
least 80% of the times with both signals). Overall, we observe very dispersed behavior.
Still, even in low proportion, sincere voting can help explain why CA1 fails to aggregate
information better than U1. This is because a veto nails down the group decision. In
other words, there is no way for strategic agents to compensate.
Extreme case We can compare this to what happens in the extreme case. First, in
V2, 12% of subjects with a red ball vote for Red (the sincere action). Furthermore, under
CA2, 6% of subjects with a red ball also vote for Red (not the sincere action). And, nally,
inspecting individual behavior (see Figure 8) one can hardly argue in favor of a clustering
in the corresponding low-right corner (there are 4 subjects that always choose the sincere
action, though). In any case, the proportion of votes that can appear to be sincere in V2
is much lower than in CA1 (recall that 28% subjects with a red ball veto in that case).31
Assuming these do indeed reect sincere voting, this raises the question of why it is more
prevalent in CA1 than in V2.
di¤erence in expected payo¤ of ones own action is low.
31The di¤erence seems much smaller in the rst half of the experiment. In particular, among agents
with red balls, 25% that vote for Red in V2 and 31% veto in CA1. Learning seems therefore stronger
under in V2.
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Figure 8: Individual behavior in V and CA treatments. Each hollow circle on the graph corre-
sponds to the observed frequency of play; its size represents the number of subjects who actually
adopted that frequency of play. The red circle represents the average frequency of play observed,
the orange triangle represents the symmetric equilibrium predictions and the green diamond rep-
resents the sincere voting prediction.
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It has been established in other contexts that framing can a¤ect choices between op-
tions. For instance, the insight that people are more likely to select a default option has
revolutionized retirement savings in the US (many companies now o¤er their employee the
option to opt out instead of having to opt in). In the Decision Theory literature, such bias
has been related to the concept of decision avoidance, which is relevant to our ndings if
one interprets the focal action in our experiment as the default option.
Decision avoidance means that [the default option] may be chosen in order to avoid
a di¢ cult decision (Dean, Kibris, and Masatlioglu 2014; see also Tversky and Shar
1992).32 For instance, Dean (2009) nds that subjects facing larger choice sets are more
likely to select the default option. Applied to our context, this leads to the hypothesis that
agents are more likely to choose the focal action (i.e., vote sincerely) if they face a more
complex situation. Our ndings are consistent with such an hypothesis, assuming that
subjects nd the extreme-case game less complex than the baseline one. This perceived
complexity level could be due to the fact that the former presents a weakly dominant
strategy and an obvious best response (even though computing the posterior involves non-
trivial calculations), whereas the latter does not (here, no calculation is really needed if
one understands the logic behind the Condorcet Jury Theorem). Strategic uncertainty, or
complexity, may therefore also play a role for the di¤erence in behavior we have observed
across the two frames.
5 Conclusion
Our main nding is that Veto dominates Unanimity in the laboratory. We therefore pro-
vide empirical support for our previous theoretical results (Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and
Malherbe, 2016). Overall, we nd that subject behavior is close to the model predictions,
and that deviations are not too costly. This provides support for external validity and
suggests that it would, indeed, be benecial for voting bodies that currently use Unanimity
to adopt Veto instead.
We have also studied the sensitivity of Vetos welfare properties to the presence of less
sophisticated agents. To do so, we have exploited the fact that Constructive Abstention
32This result is often referred to as status quobias (See for instance Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler
1991). Note that, in our context, status quo refers to something completely di¤erent. This is why we
perfer to use the phrase default option.
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is strategically equivalent to Veto, but that it changes actions focality. Our experimental
results are consistent with the presence of sincere voters and conrm our empirical pre-
diction that Vetos welfare performance are better when the action of vetoing is less focal.
This nding is probably not relevant to experienced voters such as members of the Council
of the European Union or the UN Security Council, who are unlikely to be a¤ected by
mere relabelling. But, for other committees including less experienced or sophisticated
agents, our results provide a cautionary tale: when a voting rule is such that some votes
have more weight than others, one must be careful in choosing which is the focal vote.
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Appendices
Appendix A1. Majority
To highlight the di¤erences and similarities between the voting systems, it is convenient
to dene Majority using the same aggregation rule as in the denition above (dV ) and to
label the di¤erent actions in a similar fashion.
Denition 6 Voting system Majority is dened by: M  fAM ; dMg, where
AM = fb; rg  AV and dM = dV , with Xv necessarily equal to 0.
Under Majority, agents can play b (vote for Blue) or play r (vote for Red). The group
decision is Blue if and only if there are strictly more votes for Blue than for Red.
The next Lemma characterizes the equilibria under Majority for the regions of interest.
Lemma 3 If Pr (sBj!B) = Pr(sRj!R),Majority admits a unique equilibrium: b (sB) =
1, v (sR) = 1. If a red signal is decisive, Majority admits a unique equilibrium where
b (sB) = 1  , r (sB) =  and r (sR) = 1 where  2 (0; 1).
Appendix A2. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) establishes the result for Unanimity (see
p. 26). Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe (2016) establishes the result for Veto (Propositions
6 and 9).
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. See Theorem 1 in Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe
(2016).
Proof of Lemma 2. See Propositions 6 and 9 in Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe
(2016).
Proof of Lemma 3. See Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) for the case where a red signal is
not decisive. The case were a red signal is decisive is a straightforward extension.
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Appendix A3. Additional Data and Tests
Behavior in First and Second Half of the Experiment
First Half Second Half
% Blue % Red % veto % Blue % Red % veto
Baseline Veto Blue 95.2 4.5 0.4 96.4 3.1 0.5
Red 4.7 91.3 4.0 3.2 94.5 2.3
Unanimity Blue 90.6 - 9.4 92.2 - 7.8
Red 44.1 - 55.9 52.9 - 47.1
Majority Blue 95.6 4.4 - 95.6 4.4 -
Red 4.1 95.9 - 5.2 94.8 -
CA Blue 82.6 12.4 5.1 84.5 10.6 5.0
Red 9.8 59.2 31.0 10.2 62.2 27.6
Extreme Veto Blue 85.3 12.7 2.0 86.6 12.4 1.1
Red 3.1 24.6 72.3 3.4 12.2 84.4
Unanimity Blue 98.9 - 1.1 99.5 - 0.5
Red 13.2 - 86.8 9.8 - 90.2
Majority Blue 69.0 31.0 - 66.9 33.1 -
Red 3.3 96.7 - 2.3 97.7 -
CA Blue 84.3 12.5 3.2 86.7 11.4 2.0
Red 5.3 8.9 85.8 3.8 6.1 90.1
Table 10: Aggregate behavior in the rst and second half (periods 1-25 and 26-50 respectively).
Percentage of Mistakes in First and Second Half of the Experiment
V U CA M
Baseline First half 16.0 45.3 44.7 8.7
Second half 12.7 38.3 36.3 12.3
Extreme First half 19.7 13.3 20.3 30.3
Second half 13.3 10.0 15.7 29.3
Table 11: Realized percentage of mistakes in each half of the experiment.
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Non-parametric tests on Mistakes
Setting 1 Setting 2
U V CA U V CA
M
<
z = 2:898
p = 0:004
=
z = 0:081
p = 0:935
<
z = 2:892
p = 0:004
>
z = 2:898
p = 0:004
>
z = 2:822
p = 0:005
>
z = 2:415
p = 0:016
U  
>
z = 2:898
p = 0:004
=
z = 0:493
p = 0:622
 
=
z = 1:046
p = 0:295
=
z = 1:376
p = 0:168
V    
<
z = 2:892
p = 0:004
   
=
z = 0:243
p = 0:808
Table 12: Mann-Whitney tests on the average realized information aggregation in the second half
of the experiment. The sign > (<) indicates that the amount of mistakes in the rowvoting rule
are strictly higher (lower) than the one in the columnvoting rule. = indicates that there are no
signicant di¤erences. The only comparision which changes when considering all periods is U vs
A in Setting 2: U does signicanlty better in that case.
Appendix A4. Methodology for the simulations
A simple way to do this would be to compute the proportion of right decisions that
would make a group if all 9 subjects would adopt strategies that match voting frequencies.
However, this would miss the point that heterogenous behavior can a¤ect outcomes. This
is why we base our measure of information aggregation on individual voting frequencies.
Here is how we do. We rst compute individual voting frequencies for each subject
based on the last 25 periods.33 Then, for each possible realized signal prole (i.e. for
each number of blue balls going from 0 to 9), we run 10,000 simulations where members
of a matching group (i.e. subjects in a session) are divided into two random groups and
randomly assigned the di¤erent signals. For each of these simulations we aggregate votes
and compute the outcomes. Finally, we pool the results by treatment and compute the
proportion of group decisions that coincide with that of the fully informed dictator.
33 In setting 2, three subjects never received a red ball in the second half of the experiment. For these
subjects, instead of having the average in the last half of the experiment we use the average for the whole
experiment.
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Appendix A5. Instructions
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Please read these instructions very carefully. It is
important that you do not talk to other participants during the entire experiment. In case you do
not understand some parts of the experiment, please read through these instructions again. If you
have further questions after hearing the instructions, please give us a sign by raising your hand out
of your cubicle. We will then approach you in order to answer your questions personally. Please
do not ask anything aloud.
During this experiment you will earn money. How much you earn depends partly on your
own decisions, partly on the decisions of other participants, and partly on chance. Your personal
earnings will be paid to you in cash as soon as the experiment is over. Your payo¤s during the
experiment will be indicated in Talers. At the end of the instructions we are going to explain you
how we are going to transform them into euros.
After the experiment, we will ask you to complete a short questionnaire, which we need for
the statistical analysis of the experimental data. The data of the questionnaire, as well as all your
decisions during the experiments will be anonymous.
The experiment you are participating in is a group decision making experiment. The exper-
iment consists of 50 rounds. The rules are the same for all rounds and for all participants. At
the beginning of each round you will be randomly assigned to a group of 9 participants (including
yourself). You will not know the identity of the other participants. In each round you will only
interact with the participants in your group. Your group will make a decision based on the vote of
all group members. (important to say this here, because we say before votinglater) The decision
is simply a choice between two jars, the blue jar and the red jar. In what follows we will explain
to you the procedure in each round.
The Jar. There are two jars: the blue jar and the red jar. The blue jar contains 7 blue balls
and 3 red balls. The red jar contains 7 red balls and 3 blue balls. At the beginning of each round,
one of the two jars will be randomly selected. We will call this the selected jar. Each jar is equally
likely to be selected, i.e., each jar is selected with a 50% chance. You will not be told which jar
has been chosen when making your decision.
The Sample Ball. Before voting, each of you receives a piece of information that may or may
not help you decide which is the correct jar. After a jar is selected for your group, the computer
will show each of the participants in your group (including yourself) the color of one ball randomly
drawn from that jar. We will call this ball your sample ball. Since you are 9 in your group, the
computer separately performs this random draw 9 times. Each ball will be equally likely to be
drawn for every member of the group. That is, if the color of the selected jar for your group were
red, then all members of your group would draw their sample balls from a jar containing 7 red
and 3 blue balls. If the color of your groups jar were blue, then all members of your group would
draw their sample balls from a jar containing 3 red and 7 blue balls. Therefore, if the selected jar
is blue, each member of your group has a 70% chance of receiving a blue ball. And if the selected
jar is red, each member of your group has a 70% chance of receiving a red ball.
You will only see the color of your own sample ball. This will be the only information you will
have when you vote.
Your Vote. Once you have seen the color of your sample ball, you can vote.
[Treatment M & U] You must vote for one of the two jars. That is, you must vote for Blue or
vote for Red.
[Treatment CA] You must either vote for one of the two jars or abstain. That is, you must
vote for Blue, vote for Red or Abstain.
[Treatment V] You must either vote for one of the two jars or veto the blue jar. That is, you
must vote for Blue, vote for Red or Veto Blue.
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You can vote for either option by clicking below the corresponding button. After making your
decision, please press the OKkey.
Group Decision. The group decision will be set according to. . .
[Treatment M] . . .majority. The group decision depends on the number of blue and red votes:
 If a majority of the group votes blue, the group decision is blue.
 Otherwise, if a majority of the group votes red, the group decision is red.
[Treatment U] . . . unanimity. If you or anyone in your group votes red, the group decision is
red. Otherwise, the group decision is blue. That is, the group decision is blue if and only if you
and everybody in your group vote blue.
[Treatment CA] . . . unanimity with possibility of abstention and majority quorum. If you or
anyone in your group votes red, the group decision is red. In case there is no vote for Red, the
group decision depends on the number of blue votes and abstentions:
 If less than a majority of the group abstains, the group decision is blue.
 Otherwise, if a majority of the group abstains, the group decision is red.
[Treatment V] . . .majority rule with veto. If you or anyone in your group vetoes blue, the
group decision is red. In case there is no one who vetoes blue the group decision depends on the
number of blue and red votes:
 If a majority of the group votes blue, the group decision is blue.
 Otherwise, if a majority of the group votes red, the group decision is red.
Payo¤ in Each Round. If your group decision is equal to the correct jar, each member of
your group earns 100 Talers. If your group decision is incorrect, each member of your group earns
10 Talers.
Information at the end of each Round. Once you and all the other participants have
made your choices, the round will be over. At the end of each round, you will receive the following
information about the round:
 Total number of votes for Blue
 Total number of votes for Red
 [Treatment CA] Total number of abstentions
 [Treatment V] Total number of vetoes on blue
 Group decision
 Selected jar
 Your payo¤
Final Earnings. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select 5 rounds
and you will earn the payo¤s you obtained in these rounds. Each of the 50 rounds has the same
chance of being selected. The total number of talers accumulated in these 5 selected rounds will
be transformed into euros by multiplying your earnings in talers by a conversion rate. For this
experiment the conversion rate is 0.025, meaning that 100 talers equal 2.5 Euros. Additionally,
you will earn a show-up fee of 3.00 Euros. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no
obligation to tell others how much you earned.
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